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The 2012 attacks on the U.S. Mission in Benghazi, Libya, caused a lasting impact on 
U.S. politics continuing today. However, little research regarding how the attack came to create 
such an impact, has been conducted. By conducting a qualitative analysis of statements made by 
congressional leadership and comparing it to televised news coverage, I answer two questions; 
Which U.S. political party within Congress was more successful at implementing their strategic 
communication goals in response to the 2012 attack on U.S. Mission in Benghazi, Libya? And, 
within the two parties, which one maintained a more united communication front? Previous 
research conducted shows that Republicans have a historic hold on matters of foreign policy. 
Additionally, media traditionally takes its cues from politicians when deciding what subjects to 
cover. My hypothesis predicts that Congressional Republicans were more successful and united 
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As an emerging field of study within Political Science, strategic communication creates 
space for scholars to question how and why some forms of communication are more effective 
than others. The strategy behind political strategic communication is important to understand 
within all fields, especially within the foreign policy sphere. The manner in which actors choose 
to communicate a foreign policy incident can shape the trajectory of both national and 
international politics. The attacks on U.S. Mission in Benghazi, Libya is an example of this 
phenomenon. Though the attacks themselves lasted less than twenty-four hours, they became an 
enduringly polarized political incident. This paper seeks to answer two critical questions: First, 
which U.S. political party within Congress was more successful at implementing their strategic 
communication goals in response to the 2012 attack on U.S. Mission in Benghazi, Libya? In 





To analyze the strategic communication goals of congressional leadership in response to 
this case, it is crucial to develop a coherent understanding of what occurred on September 11, 
2012. After a day confined to U.S. facilities due to the security concerns surrounding the 
anniversary of 9/11, the U.S. Special Missions Compound (SMC) in Benghazi, Libya came 
under attack at 21:41 local time (see appendix A). The attack consisted of three separate waves 
by local militias– one at the SMC and two at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Annex 
located less than a mile away. The attackers had firearms, common in Libya at the time; bats and 
flammable items which led to the destruction of property and smoke inhalation as buildings were 
set aflame. Four Americans, including U.S. Ambassador to Libya John Christopher Stevens, 
died. Ambassador Stevens’ death was the first of any active U.S. Ambassador since 1979. 
2011 was a time of ongoing conflict in the region: the contagion of the Arab Spring had 
reached Libya. The regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was challenged in a robust civil war, 
where rebels attracted some limited Foreign Internal Defense (FID) support from major powers 
(NPR Staff, 2011). In the ensuing power vacuum and confusion that accompanied the ongoing 
conflict, instability was worsened by the presence of a significant quantity of militias across an 
ideological space with significant variation. However, issues regarding militia groups brought 
additional instability to the country – particularly in Benghazi (Judy, 39). This was worsened by 
the interest that transnational actors, particularly al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), took 
in the region. These factors came together to create an incubator of resentment: young, frustrated 
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men in a leaderless country had access to arms offered by a range of appealing actors offering to 
make them men, coupled with an ideology to tie them in (Judy, p. 20).  
While Libya was going through a period of intense change, the U.S. was suffering from 
the time horizons imposed by the potential of change. The 2012 Presidential Election 
approaching rapidly, with incumbent President Barack Obama facing Republican Nominee Mitt 
Romney. Though national elections accentuate partisan divisions, America was facing increased 
polarization, primarily regarding issues of social services (Pew Research Center, 2012). These 
divides were accentuated with the May 2011 release of classified Guantanamo Bay detainee 
records regarding prisoners by Wikileaks (Temple-Raston et al., 2011). While it is hard enough 
for Cabinet departments to coordinate interagency objectives, these leaks caused decision-
makers to consider the implications of being tied to contentious decisions. The cultivation of this 
environment within the national security space encouraged agencies to pursue increasingly 
isolationist approaches within the administration, causing communication issues that became 
significant throughout the attacks in Benghazi.   
The primary U.S. based decision-makers involved in Benghazi were Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and CIA Director David Petraeus. Given the 
geographic distance, Secretary Clinton maintained contact with the Deputy Chief of Missions 
Gregory Hicks who was stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya throughout the attacks. 
Throughout the attack decision-makers placed emphasis on two goals: saving American lives and 
supporting the ground personnel in Libya, addressing the ongoing attack. While generating a 
response to the attacks, the five options considered included military action, the Foreign 
Emergency Service Team (FEST), use of allies in the region, evacuation, and a CIA contracted 
team. Of the five considered, the two implemented was the use of private military contractors 
9 
 
(PMCs, in this case, Academi), who had been working for the CIA for some time, and 
evacuation. The contracted team (based in Tripoli, Libya at the time), was seen to be the best 
response available to send immediate ground force assistance to those in Benghazi, in order to 
make evacuation possible (U.S. Cong. House. Select Comm., p. 907). Concerns around the 
United States’ increasing reliance on private military companies became an important 
conversation in the aftermath of Benghazi (Johnson et. al., 2019).  
American public opinion research has found that voters are skeptical of the use of PMCs 
(Ramirez and Wood, p. 1434). Two of the four American deaths in Benghazi were members of 
the CIA contracted team: whose deaths created a national conversation regarding the competence 
of PMC personnel deploying to respond to ongoing crises where American government 
personnel are at risk. After the second wave breached at the CIA Annex, Secretary Clinton and 
Secretary Panetta worked in tandem to enact the evacuation plan (U.S. Cong. House. Select 
Comm., p. 1225). Within twenty-four hours of the initial attack, all government personnel had 
evacuated from Libya to a U.S. military base in Germany. 
1.2 Strategic Communication 
Benghazi hit the twenty-four-hour news cycle almost immediately, once Secretary 
Clinton released remarks regarding the attacks, Nominee Mitt Romney responded with a 
statement condemning the administration's response. With the constant pressure of news 
reporting, politicians are expected to answer questions on complex issues with little notice. 
Politicians have become accustomed to boiling down complex, unfolding issues to soundbites 
appropriate for a-minute-long television segment. Strategic communication, which is essentially 
a model of persuasion and a process of the management of perceptions, is increasingly crucial for 
politicians as they increasingly interact directly with the public (Hallahan et al., 2007 and 
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Gregory, 2005). The key to understanding the nature of strategic communication is the 
intentional and calculated way that it is both conceived and incorporated (Hallahan et al., 2007).  
Strategic communication techniques and objectives are held both at the individual-level, by the 
politicians and their aides, and their party. As a result, the public receives information shaped by 
both partisan and personal preferences. 
1.3 Strategic Communication in Benghazi 
It is not a surprise, then, that the immediate responses to Benghazi were shaped by pre-
existing strategic communication methods used by those speaking out. As Secretary Clinton 
unexpectedly announced that an attack occurred in the U.S. Special Missions Compound, 
partisan framing techniques took over the conversation (Entman and Stonbely, p. 4). The fast-
paced nature of the attack in Benghazi left little time for Congressional Republicans to cultivate 
a message or to prevent less desirable actions to be taken by the incumbent Democrats in 
response to the attack. In recent political history, Republicans have developed highly 
institutionalized strategic communication systems. They have enforced party uniformity through 
the repeated usage of no-nonsense language, outperforming Democrats in their speed and 
efficacy of response (Entman and Stonbely, p. 5). Entman and Stonbely examine the media 
coverage of Benghazi and 9/11 primarily focusing on strategic communication. The authors 
conduct a story-level analysis of newspaper coverage regarding the two attacks and who or what 
entity is likely to be blamed. Primarily they focus on whether strategic communication goals 
successfully deflected blame or promoted it, even when evidence counters the claims made. The 
finding that audiences attach to the perspective of industry officials, regardless of opposing 
evidence, suggests that whoever has a more convincing message controls the narrative. When the 
media relies on public officials for information, especially concerning matters of foreign policy, 
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it could cause both a lack of accountability (when false information is repeatedly perpetuated) 
and transparency. Their conclusion that Republicans are stronger in communication tactics leads 
to the probable indication that coverage of Benghazi primarily reflected the perspective of 
Republicans.   
1.4 An Introduction to Agenda Setting, Priming, and Framing 
It is nearly impossible to discuss the establishment and success of strategic 
communication goals in the media without also discussing the effects that media has on both the 
public and on officials. The traditional watchdog role assigned to media asserts the primary 
existence of media is to hold accountable actors in positions of power, such as politicians. 
However, it is often the case that the media must over rely on the information presented by 
politicians. Media’s dependance on politicians for information has led some to believe that the 
traditional watchdog role is disappearing. This co-dependency between politicians and media has 
now become the lifeblood of American news coverage. While the watchdog factor established 
the right for the media to call attention to impropriety, corporate media hesitates to raise issues 
that stray from mainstream topics introduced by public officials (Lawrence, p. 445). Meanwhile, 
public officials rely on media coverage to relay and promote their messaging. This reliance on 
public officials becomes especially prominent when the coverage is over matters of foreign 
policy (Baum and Potter, p. 7).   
1.5 Effects of Agenda Setting, Priming, and Framing 
Agenda setting, as established by McCombs and Shaw, hypothesizes that the emphasis 
mass media puts on issues directly correlates to how important audience members view that issue 
(McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Priming, an extension of agenda-setting, “occurs when news 
content suggests to news audiences that they ought to use specific issues as benchmarks for 
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evaluating the performance of leaders and government” (Iyengar & Kinder, p. 63). Framing, a 
model often associated with both agenda-setting and priming, “is based on the assumption that 
how an issue is characterized in news reports can have an influence on how it is understood” 
(Scheufele and Tewksbury, p. 11). Media's influence has only expanded with the rise of partisan 
news networks (like MSNBC and Fox News) and social media sites.  
Media, especially when covering matters of foreign policy, rely on political leaders as the 
driving force of information and “are assumed to be more legitimate sources of newsworthy 
information” (Lawrence and Schafer, p. 770). Separate studies conducted by Noelle-Neumann 
and George Gerbner assume that the agenda-setting factor in mass media has long-term effects 
on the public due to the continuous nature of news coverage. While Gerbner faults conservative 
entertainment media, Noelle-Neumann argues that liberal media sources are more likely to cause 
these long-term effects of influence. A study conducted by Gentzkow and Shapiro finds that 
“Republicanism on demand has a clear positive relationship with…[media] slant,” contradicting 
Noelle-Neumann’s claim (Gentzkow and Shapiro, p. 54). Previous research holds that audiences 
are more likely to subscribe to media sources that promote their ideology. This concept of an 
echo-chamber creates profit-based incentives for media to frame the issues they present under a 
specific microscope to meet consumer demands (Gentzkow and Shapiro, p. 48). This poses the 
important question of why we allow media outlets to frame information? Notwithstanding 
current trends, we historically rely on our media to be objective and truthful; however, this 
“ritualized journalism” pressures journalists to present from more than one perspective. While 
this sounds ideal in theory, this pigeon holds journalists to rely solely on the words of competing 
industry leaders and leaves little room for verification of statements or a deep dive into the 




Though the Benghazi Attack has continued to have a remarkable impact, little research 
has been conducted regarding the messages formulated by the elites in decision-making roles. 
Considering the research mentioned above, I hypothesize two probable findings:  
H1: Congressional Republicans were more successful in the implementation of their 
strategic communication goals by earning more airtime – more Benghazi-related televised media 
interviews – relative to Democrats in the observed time-period.  
H₂: Congressional Republicans maintained a unified communication strategy – themes 




2. DATA AND METHODS 
2.1 Independent and Dependent Variables 
Congressional investigations into Benghazi lasted until 2016, offering a significant 
amount of time for congressional members to release statements regarding the events. However, 
with that comes the issue of additional information separate from what was originally known to 
allow the development of new or updated strategic communication goals. When narrowing the 
timeline of focus, I chose to pull coverage from the four months after the attack, specifically 
from September 12, 2012 to January 23, 2013. This timeline allowed to consider immediate 
statements from the attack to the first congressional appearance of Secretary Clinton.  
Establishing a timeline allowed me to then choose which members of congress and 
televised news networks to cover. The first congressional members I selected to analyze 
consisted of the four key members that made up the leadership team; House Speaker John 
Boehner (R – OH), House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D – CA), Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid (D – NV), and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R – KY). In addition to 
these leadership members, I included the 20 congressional members that chaired the committees 
investigating the attacks: House Armed Services Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
House Intelligence Committee, House Judiciary Committee, House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee, Senate Intelligence Committee, Senate Homeland Security and Government 
Affairs Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, and Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. Members of the leadership play an important role in shaping their party’s strategic 
communication goals, the committee members had both more experience working within the 
field of foreign policy and produced more statements regarding the issue.  
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Given the polarization of U.S. politics, the inclusion of diverse political perspectives 
within the outlets selected better scrutinized the overall coverage promoted in response to the 
attack. Additionally, media outlets have a financial incentive to promote the ideology of their 
audiences requiring the scrutinization of various outlets (Gentzkow and Shapiro, p. 48). By 
studying ABC, CBS, CNN, Fox, MSNBC, and NBC I was able to review the coverage from the 
major news outlets and those promoting different ideologies. Figure B.1 in Appendix B displays 
a graph that categorizes the different ideologies of media outlets. While it is from 2016, and 
polarization between 2012 and 2016 increased, it is still an accurate depiction of media slant in 
2012.  
2.2 Methodological Approach 
To explore which party was more successful at implementing their strategic 
communication goals and more united in their messaging, I analyzed both statements made by 
the congressional members selected, as well as interview transcripts during the time for analysis.  
To access congressional websites no longer available, I used Internet Archive and 
selected to look at the websites as they were in February 2013 to access all statements published. 
Once the websites were accessed, I navigated to the press release section and looked at all press 
statements regarding Benghazi (including remarks and letters to administrative officials) and 
saved them to be analyzed. For current members, this process was repeated, though accessed 
through active congressional websites.  
After gathering all congressional statements, I used LexisNexis to access interview 
transcripts from CNN, CBS, Fox, MSNBC, and NBC. Interviews were found by using broadly 
inclusive search terms (i.e., “Benghazi and John McCain”) then manually narrowing down items 
to include content regarding any discussion of the Benghazi or aftermath response to it. 
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Interview transcripts from ABC, not fully available in LexisNexis, were accessed via the ABC 
website through the same search process utilized in LexisNexis.  
Beginning the analysis of the information gathered required first separating the 
qualitative data into an index then calculating the quantitative data. When creating the index for 
congressional statements I started by putting each member into a spreadsheet. Based on the 
content of the statements made I created an index with six different categories; Condemn without 
mentioning accountability, condemn mentioning accountability, request answers from 
administrative officials, defend Ambassador Rice, support accountability review board report, 
and request additional information from accountability review board report. Transcribed 
interviews gathered from LexisNexis were sorted first by its network then secondly by party. 
From there I correlated the connection between network and member interview to calculate the 
total amount of interviews per party, network, and member. 
Using a qualitative analysis in addition to observational methods, the research method 
used allows for a comprehensive understanding of the research question asked. By using 
congressional websites to access statements I was able to see the statements that were most 
important for the congressional member to promote. This allowed for a better understanding of 
their perspective and influence in the aftermath of the attacks. Furthermore, given their agenda-
setting privileges, the choice to analyze mainstream televised news networks provided a better 





3. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
3.1 Hypothesis One: Analysis and Results 
H1: Congressional Republicans earned more airtime – more Benghazi-related televised 
media statements – relative to Democrats in the observed time-period.  
The analysis conducted of the research gathered determines that Republicans garnered a 
significantly higher number of interviews than Democrats, both overall and within each network. 
Figure 3.1, seen below, represents the data collected from LexisNexis regarding televised 
interviews conducted from September 12, 2012 to January 23, 2013. Of the six networks selected 
the two with the most interviews conducted were CNN and Fox. Despite MSNBC being more 
left leaning than CNN, they only conducted four interviews placing them only before NBC in 
terms of least number of interviews.  
 
Figure 3.1: Interview coverage of congressional members gathered from LexisNexis 
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The data gathered shows that between CNN and Fox, Fox was more likely to interview 
congressional members that reflect the conservative ideology often promoted within the network. 
Although CNN interviews more Democrats than Fox, CNN similarly conducted more interviews 
with Republicans than Democrats. Of the 34 interviews conducted across CNN, 28 of them were 
with Republican congressional members. Although it is unexpected that a traditionally liberal 
leaning media source gave the majority of coverage to conservative members, it also 
substantiates my previous claim that those with a more convincing message control the coverage. 
While the issue of incumbent versus opposition could be a factor in this coverage ratio, I am of 
the perspective that (in American politics) this phenomenon still pairs down to a Republican 
versus Democrat dispute. Additionally, with the hold that Republicans have on matters of foreign 
policy in conjunction with the media's reliance on public officials, it is not unimaginable that 
CNN would offer more coverage to Republican members. The Republican senator with the 
highest number of interviews was Senator McCain with a total of 38 interviews. Senator 
McCain’s coverage was mainly split between Fox and CNN at 15 interviews each. This was not 
only the largest amount of coverage within the Republican party, but among all congressional 
members analyzed. Senator McCain’s counterpart on the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Senator Carl Levin (D – MI), only appeared in three televised interviews. Senator Dianne 
Feinstein (D – CA) participated in 5 interviews also mainly split between Fox and CNN at two 
each, causing her to be the Democrat with the highest number of interviews.  
The analysis of interview coverage reflects the successful implementation of the 
Republicans strategic communication goals. Across the political spectrum, Democrats had 
significantly less interview coverage when discussing Benghazi. An unexpected result was the 
amount of Republican coverage on media outlets traditionally more liberal leaning. Research 
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formerly cited suggested that media outlets tend to reflect the ideology of their viewership (but 
see Padgett et al. 2018). Though specific research connecting the relationship between media and 
public opinion about Benghazi is needed, it isn’t a stretch to hypothesize that there is a 
correlation between the two. However, the results of this data suggest that congressional 
interviews were offered relatively equally between Democrats and Republicans. The exception 
being that Fox and CNN had slightly preferred congresspeople reflecting the ideology of the 
network. While Republicans had significantly more interviews conducted than Democrats, the 
majority of them covered the perspective of Senator McCain. However, even without the 
interviews of Senator McCain, Republicans continued to have the highest number of total 
interviews. 
3.2 Hypothesis Two: Analysis and Results 
H2: Congressional Republicans maintained a unified communication strategy – themes 
were more consistent across Republican talking points relative to Democrats.  
When analyzing the statements gathered from congressional offices, I discovered two 
items worth noting. First, there was significantly less statements released than there were 
interviews conducted. Secondly, the two categories on which Republicans commented the most 
were condemning the attack while mentioning the need for accountability and requesting more 




Figure 3.2: Statements gathered from congressional offices 
As exemplified in Figure 3.2, those whose statements included comments about the 
Administration often did so twice within the time period analyzed. Though Democrats did 
comment on the attack they were split between mentioning accountability and not. Members of 
the leadership were more likely to release press statements via their offices than appear in 
televised interviews. This goes against the trend seen from the majority of members who acted 
opposingly to the leadership. The choice to release statements rather than appear on the networks 
could be related to the prioritization of other issues to spend political capital on. Republican 
leadership, both when analyzing statements and interviews, spent more time communicating 
their messaging regarding Benghazi than Democrats did.  
Despite the usefulness of this method to gather the necessary data to create conclusive 
results, there were weaknesses that should be addressed in future research. There was substantial 
variation across congressional websites in terms of statements posted. Each website consists of 
content and design based on the members (or their staffs) discretion. This resulted in a gap 
between what some members’ sites published versus others. There were also occasions where 
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one member would post joint statements in congruence with other members, but it would only be 
available on one website (i.e., joint statements between Senator Joe Lieberman (I – CT) and 
Senator Susan Collins (R – ME) were singularly available on Senator Lieberman’s archived 
website), in this case I counted the statements under each member within the selected pool.  
Although there was less content than the televised interview coverage, Republicans 
remained more unified on their messaging when releasing congressional statements. While the 
statements released by Democrats covered more topics, Republicans focused on two criteria. 
Firstly, Republicans were mainly united when condemning the attack and calling for 
accountability. Secondly, they focused on requesting additional information from the Obama 
Administration regarding the attack. Statements from Democrats were split when mentioning 
accountability in the immediate responses to the attack. Their statements differed further when 
focusing on specific members of the Administration and defending the Accountability Review 




“Benghazi” is a loaded term in the United States, even now, almost a decade later. It 
conjures, in the American people, either disgusted outrage at the Clinton-led State Department; 
or frustration at the perceived conspiracies that emerged from the event, that perhaps marked a 
new era of partisan politics. This split is testament to the power of strategic communication, of 
both parties. Yet, it’s clear that Republicans are better able to manage and implement their 
communication goals than the Democrats within the foreign policy sphere. Research conducted 
repeatedly shows that across various media outlets, Republican messaging is promoted over 
Democrats when discussing matters of foreign policy (Entman and Stonbely, 2018). The late 
Senator McCain became a spokesperson for the Republican Party, and as a trusted official 
known to work effectively as a bipartisan, the party was able to leverage his political capital and 
credibility with the public to amplify their messaging. 
If the Democratic Party wants to ‘take back’ foreign policy, they need to build the party 
infrastructure to control the narrative in much the same way that has been successfully 
implemented by the counterpart. Strategic communication places an emphasis on short-term and 
long-term objectives (Hallahan et. al., 2007). In the case of short-term objectives, the ability to 
quickly respond to a situation in a coordinated effort helps audiences attach to a point-of-view 
before evidence can contradict it. Republicans responded in an efficient and convincing manner 
to the crisis as a cohesive unit to promote their objectives. Long-term goals require repetition and 
coordination for a successful outcome. The ownership of foreign policy did not happen 
overnight, but in a coordinated effort that contained messages that mirror each other. In both 
cases, Democrats fall short in comparison to their Republican counterparts. At these windows of 
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opportunity, having a unified, easy message for the public to hear and adopt would have served 
the party better than lengthy, logically valid discussions on Benghazi and its management.  
In an analysis of televised interview coverage across six networks and congressional 
statements published, the results clearly show that Republicans were united in their messaging 
and successful in their implementation. Democrats, on the other hand, lacked uniformity and 
promotion of their strategic communication goals. These findings encourage the development of 
research in two areas. Firstly, additional research specific to Benghazi should be conducted, as 
well as the connection between the party’s strategic communication goals and public opinion. 
Secondly, the role that PMCs play in foreign policy, both within the U.S. and abroad, should be 
examined more carefully. The “cloak and dagger” nature of PMCs has led to a series of 
unanswered questions when attempting to understand the decisions of public officials. Not only 
should this be a priority for researchers, but also those who have an interest in government 
transparency.  
This brings me back to my concluding consideration: having a better understanding of 
our leaders’ strategic goals and decisions, especially in matters of foreign policy, not only helps 
hold decision makers accountable, but also gives us a glimpse into the future of foreign policy. 
Furthering research within this field is crucial to this understanding. Americans with differing 
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APPENDIX A: BENGHAZI TIMELINE 




2145 local: Embassy Tripoli set up command center and notified 
Washington (also reached out to LAR and Armed forces 




2145-2200 local: Local intruders attack SMC entrance and breach Villa C 
(where Ambassador Stevens, ARSO 1, and IMO Sean 
Smith were located) 
 
 
2200 local: Villa C set aflame and ARSO 1, Ambassador Stevens, and 
IMO Smith attempt to escape the safe room – only ARSO 
1 escapes. ARSO 1 and other diplomatic security members 
continuously attempt to recover IMO Smith and 
Ambassador Stevens, only being able to recover the 
remains of IMO Smith 
 
 
1700 (Washington D.C. Time): 
 
AFRICOM surveillance drone rerouted from previous 
mission to serval Benghazi and President Obama briefed 
during a regularly scheduled intelligence briefing from 
Leon Panetta and Marty Dempsey 
 
 
2205 local: CIA Annex response team departs to SMC 
 
 
1705 (Washington D.C. Time): Secretary Clinton notified of the attack by Steve Mull 
(Departments Executive Secretary) and calls POTUS 
 
 
2300 local: AFRICOM surveillance aircraft monitors the area 
 
 
2330 local: Remaining team from SMC and annex team arrive at the 
CIA Annex w/o Ambassador Stevens shortly coming under 
attack at the CIA Annex 
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0030 local: Six-person CIA contracted security team departs from 
Tripoli to Benghazi 
 
 
0130 local: Security team arrives in Benghazi 
 
 
0500 local: Six-person response team arrives to provide support, facing 
heavy impact within 15 mins arrival 
 
 
0515 local: Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods (members of the CIA 
contracted security team) killed 
 
 




0730 local: Depart from Benghazi to Tripoli 
 
1130 local: Last U.S. government personnel evacuated with 
Ambassador Stevens remains to Tripoli 
 
 
1415 local: C-17 departs Germany for Libya 
 
 
1925 local: All U.S. government personnel departed Libya on a C-17 





APPENDIX B: MEDIA BIAS CHART (2016) 
 
Figure B.1: Media Bias Chart Courtesy of Ad Fontes Media  
